Three mysterious synods: What was decided in relation to the UOC?
This week, sessions of three synods of different Orthodox Churches were held. What did they decide regarding the existence of the Church in Ukraine?
This week, sessions of three different synods were held by the UOC, the ROC, and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Each of these synods met with specific expectations, all of which essentially revolved around one question: Ukraine.
Currently, the religious situation in Ukraine is clearly deteriorating, and tensions surrounding the Church are intensifying to such an extent that no one can foresee where this might lead.
Naturally, in this situation at hand, each Church has its own interests and seeks to resolve its issues.
For the Patriarchate of Constantinople, Ukraine has become a serious blow to its authority and ability to make fair and unbiased decisions. The Tomos for the OCU did not deliver any anticipated unity; instead, it brought about an unprecedented level of tension, visible to all Orthodox Churches. This means that Patriarch Bartholomew has had to answer increasingly uncomfortable questions.
It can be argued that he is growing weary of these questions since the announcement of the upcoming Holy Synod session appeared on the Ecumenical Patriarchate's website on October 18 – the day after clashes in Cherkasy. Naturally, each blow to the heads of Orthodox believers in Cherkasy is also a blow to the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s authority within the Orthodox world. Thus, his task in this situation is clear: how to make the “transitions” from the UOC to the OCU not only “painless” but also faster.
In other words, the goal is to justify the creation of the OCU with evident unity in Ukrainian Orthodoxy and ensure that it remains completely independent of Moscow.
For the ROC, the situation is equally clear. It seeks to more effectively counter the Phanar’s plans and to hold on to even the smallest hope that the UOC will remain in canonical unity with the ROC. Unlike the Synod members in Moscow, we expected little from this Synod. Their gaze, however, was fixed on Kyiv, as the ROC has no ties with the UOC at the moment and can only guess at what will be decided within the walls of the St. Panteleimon Monastery.
The surprising thing is that they weren’t the only ones left guessing.
If the goals of the ROC and the Ecumenical Patriarchate are understandable, the UOC’s goal remains a mystery within this power struggle between the Churches, each claiming the status of “Mother Church” for Ukraine. This is why the faithful of the UOC anticipate each synod in the hope that the bishops will guide them on what to do in the current situation and where the Church ship will sail. Given what is happening with the UOC from a logical standpoint, some reaction is needed, preferably an adequate and Gospel-based response.
Thus, although the Synods were different, expectations from them were almost identical: what will happen to the UOC? So what did the bishops, who met in Istanbul, Moscow, and Kyiv, decide?
Istanbul
It is worth reiterating that the announcement of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Holy Synod session appeared on the website of the Church of Constantinople on October 18 – following the beating of believers in Cherkasy. Various sources indicated that the seizure of the UOC cathedral, where Metropolitan Theodosiy of Cherkasy served, shocked Patriarch Bartholomew. He had previously expressed disapproval of the violence inflicted by the OCU on the UOC, even demanding that Dumenko put a stop to it. The events in Cherkasy served as yet another trigger, clearly demonstrating that the “Ukrainian issue” could no longer be delayed. It was thus expected that the resolute Patriarch Bartholomew would reach some kind of decision.
To keep things from spiraling out of control, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha urgently traveled to Istanbul. Little is known about what he specifically discussed with the Phanariots, though it was made public that Patriarch Bartholomew asked the Ukrainian Foreign Minister to ensure that Ukrainian bishops could freely travel abroad to visit the Patriarchate.
Even from this minimal report, one can infer that Patriarch Bartholomew wants to meet with OCU's and perhaps UOC's bishops, who can personally fill him in about what is happening in Ukraine. For instance, there is considerable discontent among “bishops” in Dumenko's structure, who are displeased with Epifaniy’ leadership style, accusing him of total dependence on Evstratiy Zoria. Figures like Zinkevych and Shostatsky believe they are more worthy and experienced not only to lead the OCU but to attempt negotiations with the UOC. Bartholomew's request to Sybiha could thus be motivated by his desire to hear various perspectives in order to make an informed decision on handling the OCU and Dumenko.
The situation is further complicated by two influential factions within the Patriarchate, each with a different stance on the “Ukrainian issue” While Elpidophoros’ “faction” supports dialogue with the UOC, Emmanuel’s “faction”, backed by Dumenko and Zoria, wants no dialogue – only elimination.
For this reason, Orthodox Times, funded by the U.S. State Department, reported on a recent meeting in which a member of the patriarchal commission, who visited Ukraine in August, gave a presentation. “The atmosphere during the discussion that followed was tense,” Orthodox Times wrote.
The tension arose from the fact that “the synodal hierarchs apparently concluded from the report that the delegation’s visit yielded no positive results.”
Orthodox Times also reported that “some hierarchs raised the possibility of convening a new unification council,” and “some synodal hierarchs questioned whether the election of Epifaniy as head of the OCU was ultimately the right choice.” Furthermore, the publication noted that “during the session, the opinion of Metropolitan Sawa of Warsaw was voiced, suggesting that a new leader be found for the Autocephalous Church of Ukraine.”
What does this mean?
At the very least, it indicates that more hierarchs in the Patriarchate are deeply dissatisfied with the behavior of OCU followers in Ukraine. There is also dissatisfaction with Epifanit himself and his inability to govern the OCU. Evidence of this can be found in a letter from Bishop Michael of Comana, the Exarch of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, read at the synodal session. In this letter, the exarch offered a very negative assessment of Dumenko’s leadership of the OCU.
Kyiv
It remains unknown what exactly the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Synod decided. In fact, the most recent UOC Synod has been the most mysterious, as none of its decisions were published in church media, and none of the participating bishops have commented on the results (the available comment reveals nothing about the outcomes). From various sources, we only know that the Synod made several personnel decisions: appointing a new ruling bishop to the Tulchyn See, Archbishop Sergius (Anitsoy), and ordaining two archimandrites as bishops (one of whom, we understand, is from Odesa; nothing is known about the other).
This silence from the Synod has fueled speculation and rumors about what actually happened in Feofaniya.
Rumor has it that His Beatitude convened the Synod solely to confidentially discuss the Church’s continued existence under unprecedented state persecution. This seems plausible, given the high level of secrecy surrounding the Synod’s decisions.
We can consider that an alternative scenario could have involved dialogue with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. However, it’s quite possible that this was temporarily hindered by Sybiha’s urgent visit to the Phanar. It’s conceivable that during his meeting with the Phanariots, the foreign minister managed to secure some sort of “temporary reprieve” for Zoria and Dumenko. Sybiha may have agreed with Patriarch Bartholomew to: a) refrain from making any major decisions regarding changes in OCU leadership for now; b) allow any bishop Patriarch Bartholomew wants to see to come to the Phanar; and c) create a commission to address the “Ukrainian issue”.
In return, the Ukrainian foreign minister promised that incidents like the one in Cherkasy would not happen again.
In other words, Sybiha has simply bought the OCU some time, hoping that over the next few months, with active support from Ukrainian authorities, Dumenko and Zoria can “convince” the UOC to either join the ranks of the “patriotic church” or disappear from Ukraine’s religious landscape. Whether this will work remains to be seen. But in any case, we can note that certain processes are underway, and it would be far better if these processes were brought out from under cover. Left hidden, they risk slipping out of control.
Moscow
With the Moscow Patriarchate, things are straightforward: the ROC Synod focused on its own issues while also watching developments in Kyiv and the Phanar with intense interest. Since no major decisions were made in either of those places, the ROC likewise refrained from saying anything about Ukraine. Still… why “anything”? It did make a statement by removing a long-serving ruling bishop from the Donetsk Eparchy.
Considering that, according to ROC documents, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is self-reliant and that only the UOC Synod appoints bishops within its dioceses, the decision to retire Metropolitan Hilarion is non-canonical and clearly demonstrates the ROC’s intrusion into the territory of another Church. Thus, how the Russian Synod members can criticize those in Turkey remains entirely unclear. This means any of their decisions about Ukraine may now be assessed through the lens of them violating Church canons.
Conclusions
After the synodal sessions held by the UOC, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the ROC , from which we all expected so much, things have become neither easier nor clearer. We still lack an answer to how the Ukrainian Orthodox Church should build its relationships with the Phanar, the ROC, and the Ukrainian State. From a human perspective, this is undoubtedly disappointing.
But if we consider this in terms of the Gospel, it’s quite simple: the Church (any Church) should focus solely on how to build its relationship with Christ. Only then will “the gates of hell not prevail against it.” We hope the UOC has chosen precisely this path.
