An "alternative plan" of the UOC movement

Photo: UOJ collage

A few days ago, the vice-rector of the Kyiv Theological Academy and Seminary, Volodymyr Bureha, said in an interview with Bulgarian journalist Momchil Metodiev that the UOC has not decided on an "identity" yet and is allegedly divided into certain parties, each of which has its own needs and wants.

Since Bureha is not just an ordinary person, his statements are taken seriously by many "analysts" and people far from the internal realities of the UOC. What lies behind these statements?

The UOC status

Volodymyr Bureha's interview can be conditionally divided into several key theses, the first of which is "the problem with the identity of the UOC". The KDAiS vice-rector says that the resolutions of the Council of Feofaniya posed "a serious problem with the identity of the UOC, because today its status is neither autocephaly nor autonomy, and the term used is not traditional in canonical law because such a term does not exist there." At the same time, Bureha stressed that there is no term "autocephaly" in the decrees of the Ecumenical Councils either, and it is "not clearly defined in the canons of the Church".

But this did not prevent some commentators from claiming that the KDAiS vice-rector admitted that the UOC exists in some "grey canonical zone". However, this conclusion is not true. We’ll try to explain.

At the Council in Feofaniya, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church declared itself independent of the ROC. This independence is of an administrative nature, and the decisions of the Council only confirmed the actual state of affairs.

At the same time, no one from the leadership of the ROC challenged these decisions, which means that the UOC has no problems with its canonical status The "problem with identity" for Bureha is not a "grey canonical zone" for Hovorun, and these theses should not be confused.

Because Bureha clearly states what he means: "Within the UOC, in my opinion, one cannot speak of a unified identity. More precisely, there are different groups within the UOC that interpret the decisions of the ‘council’ of 27 May 2022 in different ways. There is a group of those who believe that the connection with the Moscow Patriarchate has not been completely broken, and even in Kyiv there are monasteries and churches that continue to commemorate Patriarch Kirill during the liturgy. There is also a group that believes that these decisions have led to a complete severing of ties, and that the UOC is de facto autocephalous, although it does not use that term. There are also a large number of priests and laity who are simply confused, who do not understand what the status of our Church is."

In other words, it goes about processes taking place inside the UOC that are difficult to externalize. "The grey canonical zone" is precisely the external perception of our Church.

But here, there are absolutely no problems. Because not priest of the UOC has yet heard in his address what the "priests" of the OCU get: "you are not canonical" or "your status is unclear, and I will not serve the Liturgy with you". For example, when Bulgarian Patriarch Neophyte died and Dumenko came to his funeral, Metropolitan John of Varna and Veliki Preslav said that Epifaniy' arrival might concern some people, "since his status has not yet been determined".

And in general, can someone explain what the phrase "grey canonical zone" means? Because, by analogy with the same OCU, there are Churches that do not recognise Dumenko, there are those who do, and there are those for whom he is "in the grey zone". Do we see the same with the UOC? No. It is recognised as a canonical Church by all the Churches of the world. So, what "zone" is it in? The answer is obvious.

The direction of movement

Further, in the context of the conversation about the Council in Feofaniya, Volodymyr Bureha said that by its decisions "the leadership has determined the direction in which we are moving. The direction is towards full independence of the UOC".

And in this case, Bureha did not say anything seditious. The direction of the movement is not yet its completion. There is nothing wrong with the movement towards "full independence" of the Church. To criminalise or deny the idea of autocephaly just because it was once tarnished by Filaret Denisenko is silly.

Let's remember that Churches, much smaller in number and historically less significant than the UOC, have their autocephalies. Moreover, they celebrate them on a grand scale.

For example, 2024 in Romania is declared the year of the Romanian Patriarchate; and in the same year the Polish Orthodox Church will celebrate the 100th anniversary of its autocephaly under the patronage of President Andrzej Duda. If autocephaly is considered so bad for some (for us), then why is it so good for others (for example, for the Poles)? Therefore, the problem is not in autocephaly as a phenomenon, but in how and by what means it is gained, and what the Church hierarchy does to ensure that its perception depends not on "the elders said" but on theological and intellectual reevaluation.

Autocephaly is not a panacea, not a "fix-all idea" but only a tool that helps the Church fulfil its mission in the world. That's how we should look at it. In other words, if the UOC receives autocephaly, will it help it spiritually and missionally? That's how the question should be framed.

At the same time, Bureha's words about the "direction" of movement towards full autocephaly of the UOC give hope that achieving the result will be done through canonical means, and not through lawlessness, as in the case of Denisenko. If the "leadership" wanted autocephaly at any cost, it would have already been proclaimed. But the point is that the leadership does not want autocephaly at any cost.

An "alternative plan"

And here we come to the most interesting part. Bureha says that "the part of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church that favours complete independence from Moscow, autocephaly, is outlining a certain 'alternative plan'".

The plan is for the UOC to first restore relations with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which are now broken, and restore Eucharistic communion with Constantinople.

Further, this part of the UOC wants to send a delegation to Constantinople and start negotiations on the settlement of the UOC status, and at the same time inside Ukraine the UOC should also start negotiations with the OCU.

That is, there is a "part" within our Church that favours independence from Moscow. We do not argue, there is. And quite a large one. There are no questions here.

Questions arise when we read about this very "alternative plan", which includes the resumption of relations with the Phanar and dialogue with the OCU.

But, first of all, is the restoration of Eucharistic communion a bad thing? It is another matter on what conditions it is possible. After all, the break of eucharistic communication between the UOC and the Phanar is not a whim of one person or a small group of people, but a painful decision provoked by the recognition of the legitimacy of the OCU by Patriarch Bartholomew. And it cannot be simply "restored".

Secondly, settling the UOC status with the Phanar is a very doubtful prospect, because Patriarch Bartholomew has already appointed someone whom he considers to be the "Metropolitan" of Kyiv – and it is not Metropolitan Onuphry.

Thirdly, it is unclear what "negotiations" can be held with the OCU, bypassing the decisions of the Council of Feofaniya, which Bureha constantly refers to? Everything is clearly defined there. And as of today, the prospect of any dialogue with the OCU is as distant as the realization of the "alternative plan" voiced by Bureha. He himself understands this when he says: "There is no constructive dialogue between the UOC and the OCU today."

Therefore, the "alternative plan" is a fiction. Moreover, it is completely unclear who stands behind it, and therefore, it is unclear who will "implement" it.

Who are these people?

There is an impression that all those people who advocate for the complete independence of the UOC from Moscow are automatically making "plans" to restore Eucharistic communion with the Constantinople Church, and they are the ones who are already assembling a delegation to the Phanar and preparing for negotiations with Dumenko. But who are these people?

His Beatitude is definitely not among them. Everything he could do and wanted to do – he has already done. There will be nothing more than what happened at the Council of Feofaniya.

However, to expect that the "supporters of autocephaly" not only make "alternative plans" but also attempt to implement them behind the back of His Beatitude means not understanding the realities in which the Kyiv Metropolis lives. Because those people who make "alternative plans" cannot implement them because they decide nothing. Even if we were talking about the synodals or some group of bishops united by the idea of autocephaly, we would still cast serious doubt on the implementation of the plan voiced by Bureha. It is unrealistic, fantastical, and not worth the paper it's written on. And not only because it "will provoke a sharp reaction from Moscow in the form of ecclesiastical court, bans or even excommunication from the Church," as Bureha says. But primarily because our Church seems to have come to terms with what is happening. Its leadership seemingly remains silent and does nothing. And even if all this does not "seem" but is, let's ask ourselves, is it good or bad?

Judge for yourselves. In the conditions in which the people of Ukraine are currently living, in which the UOC finds itself, there can be no well-thought-out, balanced, and, most importantly, canonically-verified decisions.

Autocephaly, if proclaimed, will not be recognised by several Local Churches. This thesis is also voiced by Bureha: "The UOC deliberately refrained from proclaiming autocephaly to avoid conflict with other Local Churches because if it declared autocephaly, it can be confidently predicted that it would not be recognised by any Local Church, which would lead to a rupture of relations between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and other Local Churches."

For those who didn't understand – let's explain. At the very least, among those who won't recognize it will be the ROC and the Serbian Church. But even the Greeks won't recognize the self-proclaimed autocephaly because for the Phanar, Greece, Cyprus and Africa, there is already "autocephaly" in Ukraine – the OCU. Nor will the autocephaly of the UOC be recognised in Jerusalem, Antioch, Albania, and Bulgaria. Other Churches are also in question. And all this is not because no one wants to quarrel with the ROC but because the self-proclamation of the UOC's autocephaly will only aggravate the already problematic situation in the Orthodox world. So why proclaim it? Just to convince Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of its independence from Moscow? Believe me, this argument will be unconvincing for him. Then for what? To stop the seizure of churches? But seizures can only be stopped if the Ukrainian authorities remember that there is Law or when the OCU remembers that there is the Gospel, which is doubtful in both cases. So, what will we achieve by proclaiming autocephaly? Absolutely nothing. And even the "alternative plan" won't help here.

What will help? What should be done?

Do what His Beatitude does – pray. From the outside, it seems that he has chosen a tactic of inaction. But Metropolitan Onuphry acts just as St. Gregory the Theologian wrote about himself: "The most important thing for me is inaction. If everyone imitated me, there would be no troubles for the Churches, and faith, which now everyone turns into a weapon of their love for disputes, would not suffer reproaches."

In his "inaction", the Primate of the UOC has chosen the most unusual tactic for the modern world – seeking the Divine will, asking God to solve all our problems. This seems utterly "mad" and illogical. Because from the outside, it's clearer, and "something should be done". But the problem is that at the moment, the UOC is in a zugzwang, where every move will only worsen its situation. What remains then? To pray and wait. That is, to do exactly what His Beatitude does.

And we believe that his prayer means more than all the "alternative plans" combined, and it will surely be heard.

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