Expertise from Zelensky as coercion of the Ukrainian Church to suicide
A critical assessment of the resolution of the Ukrainian State Service for Ethnopolitics Freedom of Conscience.
Greek theologian and presbyter Anastasios Gotsopoulos wrote an analytical analysis of the State Ethnopolitics Expertise on the UOC's ties with the Moscow Patriarchate exclusively for the Greek branch of the UOJ. We offer you a translation of the full text of the Greek priest's article.
The "State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience" (DESS) published Resolution No. Η-8/11 of 27.1.2023, titled: "Conclusion of the Religious Expert Examination of the Statute on Governance of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church for the presence of ecclesiastical and canonical ties with the Moscow Patriarchate".
The Resolution accepts the findings of the Expert Group established to investigate the relationship of the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) under His Beatitude Metropolitan Onufriy of Kyiv with the Russian Church. Through this Resolution, the Ukrainian State Service sought to prove that the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church is dependent on the Moscow Patriarchate, despite its declared independence.
General Comments
1. We would like to emphasise that the Ukrainian Church under the canonical Metropolitan Onufriy of Kyiv is recognized as canonical because it is recognised by all 14 Local Orthodox Churches, including the four (Ecumenical and Alexandrian Patriarchates, and the Churches of Greece and Cyprus) that have accepted the "autocephaly" of the OCU. We also note that there has been no canonical procedure for the removal of Metropolitan Onuphry of Kyiv from the office he has held since 17.08.2014 and which, moreover, has been recognised by all fourteen Local Orthodox Churches. Therefore, in the absence of any canonical punishment, Metropolitan Onufriy remains the canonical Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine.
2. The new ecclesiastical structure under Epifaniy, which received the "Tomos of Autocephaly" (06.01.2019) from Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, has been recognised by only three Local Churches (Alexandria, Greece, Cyprus), while the remaining ten Local Churches and Patriarchates have neither recognised its autocephaly nor the episcopacy of this structure. The vast majority of Orthodox Churches (10 Patriarchates and Churches) do not recognise the canonical ordination of Epifaniy Dumenko.
3. It is clear that the conclusion of the Expert Group, on which this Resolution is based, is government-ordered and aims at prohibiting the operation of the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
4. The Kyiv Metropolis of the UOC has already appealed to Ukrainian court against the decision of the Expert Commission. The Kyiv Regional Administrative Court on 25 August 2023 accepted the appeal, and its decision is pending. In its statement, the Legal Service of the UOC remarked: "We hope that in the near future, the court will take the appropriate decision that will halt the use of this unlawful expertise for the purpose of gross interference in the internal affairs of the largest Church in Ukraine, as well as actions aimed at violating the religious freedom rights of 12,000 religious organisations of the UOC and millions of faithful citizens of Ukraine."
Brief History
The Metropolis of Kyiv and the surrounding region (which was known in ecclesiastical documents as "Little Russia" (the name given in ecclesiastical documents to the region of present-day Ukraine [Ukraine = near the edge/border]) was under the canonical jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople from the 10th to the 17th centuries. In 1686, Ecumenical Patriarch Dionysius IV subjected Kyiv to the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, granting it the right to ordain and judge the bishops of Little Russia. In the Patriarchal and Synodal Act (1686), the Patriarch of Constantinople, Dionysius IV, decides that the "most holy province of Kyiv" is to be subject to the "most holy patriarchal throne of the great and God-protected city of Moscow" [4]. In a letter to the Russian monarchs, Patriarch Dionysius IV clarified to avoid misinterpretation: "Let this Metropolis of Kiev be subordinate to the Most Holy Patriarchal Throne of Muscovy, and let the bishops therein recognise as Elder and Primate the Patriarch of Moscow, as he will be at the present time, as those who are ordained by him."
Thus, from 1686 to 2018, for 332 consecutive years, the Metropolis of Kyiv and all of present-day Ukraine (Little Russia), in line with the pan-Orthodox ecclesiastical consensus – without any objection – was under the Church of Russia. Even the Ecumenical Patriarchate always considered Ukraine to be part of the Russian Church, as evidenced by a related study of ours and the statements of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew during the 2016 Assembly of the Primates of the Orthodox Churches in Chambésy.
In 1921, with the establishment of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (within the framework of the USSR), the demand for ecclesiastical independence began to develop, leading to the illicit creation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the "Church of the self-ordained", as it was called, because it lacked canonical priesthood.
With the collapse of communism in the late 1980s, the demand for ecclesiastical independence from the Church of Russia resurfaced. On 9 July 1990, the Ukrainian bishops under Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko) of Kyiv submitted a request to the Russian Church as the Mother Church to grant them autonomy. On 25-27 October 1990, the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church under Patriarch Alexius II granted Ukraine extensive ecclesiastical autonomy:
According to this decision, the autonomy of Ukraine is very broad: its Statute stipulates that "The Orthodox Church of Ukraine is independent and autonomous in its governance and structure" (Article I,1), it has its own Сouncil of Bishops composed of all bishops of Ukraine (Article I,2), which handles "all matters related to the life of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church" (Article III,6). The Council of Bishops, without the participation of a representative from the Moscow Patriarchate (here and hereafter the author's emphasis – Ed.), elects its bishops (right of ordination – jus ordinandi), including its Primate (historically the title of Metropolitan of Kyiv) (Article III,9), and certainly has the right of judgement over the above-mentioned (right of judgment – jus jurandi) (Article 8).
Furthermore, "The Council of Bishops canonises saints and adopts liturgical rites composed in their honour." (Article III,7). Additionally, the Council independently adopts the Statute and makes amendments and additions to it (Article II,7)! Its decisions do not require Moscow's approval, nor does Moscow have the right to veto any decision of the Council of Bishops of Ukraine. Finally, the Metropolitan of Kyiv had previously participated in the Moscow Patriarchate's Synod as the first in rank. It should be noted that while the Primate of the Ukrainian Church participated in the Russian Synod, no representative of the Russian Church participated in the Synod of Ukraine. With its decision of 27 May 2022, the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Church decided that the Metropolitan of Kyiv would no longer participate in the Holy Synod of the Russian Church.
While the Ukrainian Church actually enjoys complete independence in its administration, the spiritual bond that has always existed between the two Churches remains: “The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is connected through our Russian Orthodox Church to the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church” (para. 3).
It is worth noting that the autonomy granted to the Ukrainian Church is much broader than that granted by the Ecumenical Patriarchate to the Autonomous Churches of Finland and Estonia, or to the semi-autonomous Church of Crete:
a) In the Church of Estonia, “the election, ordination, and replacement of the metropolitan are done by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, while the other bishops are appointed by the metropolitan”, b) similarly, in the Church of Finland, and c) whereas in the Church of Crete, the election of Metropolitans is done by the diocesan Synod and the Archbishop by the Patriarchate of Constantinople.
In other words, based on the decision of 27.10.1990 of the Holy Synod of the Russian Church, the UOC enjoys full administrative independence under the Moscow omophorion, but in inter-Orthodox relations, it participates as a structure of the Russian Church.
A small number of Ukrainian bishops did not accept the autonomy and broke away, creating a schism. The leader of the schism, Metropolitan Filaret, was deposed (June 1992) and excommunicated (1997). Filaret, exercising his right of appeal, immediately went to the Ecumenical Patriarchate and submitted his appeal in person. The Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew examined the case in detail, sending a delegation to Moscow (including Metropolitan John (Zizioulas) of Pergamon) and rejected Filaret's appeal (26.08.92), accepting the Russian Church's decision of deposition and later excommunication. This decision was upheld by the other Orthodox Churches. Filaret, despite being deposed and excommunicated, continued his schismatic activities and "ordained" many "bishops", proclaiming himself "Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus'!"
The vast majority of the Orthodox Ukrainian people did not follow the schism but remained faithful to the Church of their fathers, the Church in which they were baptised and raised.
On 6 January 2019, at the request of the schismatic groups, and despite the categorical refusal of the recognized canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church recognized by all Orthodox Churches, the Ecumenical Patriarch granted the "Tomos of Autocephaly" to the schismatic groups of Filaret Denysenko and Makariy Maletych, leading to the establishment of a new ecclesiastical structure under Epifaniy Dumenko.
Both the Ukrainian Government under Poroshenko and the schismatics assured the Ecumenical Patriarchate that the faithful remain in the canonical Church under Metropolitan Onufriy due to the pressure from Moscow, and that with the granting of autocephaly, most of the more than 100 bishops, thousands of priests, and millions of believers of the (canonical) Church under Onufriy would leave their Church and join the new ecclesiastical structure of Epifaniy. Unfortunately for them, however, their predictions and desires were not confirmed:
Only one metropolitan, one titular bishop and a few priests left the canonical Church for Epifaniy’s structure. The temples of the new autocephalous structure are empty of believers.
Faced with this failure of autocephaly, instead of coming to their senses and repenting, its initiators launched a merciless war against the canonical Church with church raids, forced relocations of parishioners, thuggery, and persecutions by state services and paramilitary groups against the clergy and Orthodox believers, such as we would only find in atheistic regimes. The sad thing is that all of this is happening not only with the tolerance but also with the blessings, and even the complicity of the officials – bishops and priests – of the autocephalous structure (OCU – Ed). However, despite these difficulties, the people have risen as modern Confessors, remaining faithful to the Church in which they were born, baptised and raised. They remain faithful to the Church of their fathers. After all, the Ukrainian Orthodox have experience of persecution…
In February 2022, with the declaration of Russia's war against Ukraine, the architects and supporters of the "Tomos of Autocephaly" believed that their problem would be solved, and that the bishops, other clergy, and the faithful who remained loyal to the canonical Church under Onufriy would join the autocephaly of Epifaniy. Thus, at last, the churches of the autocephalous structure would be filled with believers.
In vain…
Once again, their predictions and desires were proven wrong. Not only that, but every argument they had been using to justify their disdain by the Ukrainian Orthodox and the insistence of the vast majority of the Ukrainian people (both clergy and laity) to remain in their tradition, in the Church of their fathers, in the canonical Orthodox Church, has now been dispelled. Now the invocation of the argument that Moscow is pressuring, influencing and... funding the thousands of clergy and millions of believers not to join Epifaniy but to remain in the canonical Church despite the persecution they suffer shows at least those who invoke it as fools...
Thus, the persecution, imprisonment, acts of violence, and bullying against bishops, priests, and believers have intensified. Parish churches were seized with crowbars, metal saws, tear gas, and even gunfire. Again, no result. The faithful people turn their faces away from Epifaniy and his structure. Finally, the Zelensky Government, with the support of the autocephalous ecclesiastical structure, even of its primate Epifaniy himself, followed the steps of the Soviet atheist regime and sought to outlaw the canonical Orthodox Church under Metropolitan Onufriy, recognised by all fourteen Orthodox Churches and Patriarchates.
Expert Group
Despite the serious reactions both within Ukraine and, more importantly, from the international community, the Ukrainian Parliament passed Law No. 8371/20.8.2024 (signed by President Zelensky on 28.08.24), which includes a provision stating that any Church whose administrative centre is located in Russia should be outlawed.
As we have already mentioned, the canonical Orthodox Church of Ukraine, under Metropolitan Onufriy, had a status of a wide autonomy and practically full independence in its administration. Nevertheless, by its Synodal decision of 27.05.2022, the Church amended its Statute and clearly reaffirmed that it is entirely independent in its governance from the Moscow Patriarchate. The decisions of the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Church were communicated to the relevant Ukrainian authorities in the letter No. 464/1.6.2022 from its Primate, Metropolitan Onufriy. Additionally, with his official letter No. 838/28.9.2022, he provided clarifications on certain provisions of the UOC Statute, as amended by the Synodal decision of 27.05.2022.
However, the Zelensky government is determined, by all means, to outlaw the canonical Church. In January 2023, in view of the discussion and adoption of Law No. 8371/20.8.2024, it formed an Expert Group with the aim of investigating the relationship between the canonical Church and the Moscow Patriarchate. The conclusions of the Expert Group were accepted by the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience, which issued its Order No. Η-8/11/27.1.2023, de facto rejecting the amendments to the Church's Statute as decided by the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Church. More specifically, the Expert Group's findings state that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church:
- It enjoys certain rights of independence, but it is not an autocephalous Church.
- In relation to the Russian Orthodox Church, it has an ecclesiastical and canonical connection of the part to the whole. The relationship between the UOC and the Russian Orthodox Church is not that of one independent (autocephalous) Church to another independent autocephalous Church. The UOC also does not have the status of an autonomous Church, which would be ecognized by other Churches.
- It does not function as an independent (autocephalous) Church and does not proclaim its own independence (autocephaly).
Evaluation of the Conclusion of the Expert Group and the Resolution
Regarding the final conclusions of the Expert Group and the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience's Resolution No. Η-8/11/27.1.2023, we note the following:
1. Essentially, the conclusions bring nothing new; they certainly do not make any revelations. Instead, they conclude the well-known reality, not only in Ukraine but throughout the Orthodox world, that the Ukrainian Church under Metropolitan Onufriy of Kyiv is not autocephalous but autonomous with extensive administrative independence. The report states that it "enjoys certain rights of independence but is not an autocephalous Church." In other words, the report admits that from an administrative perspective, the Ukrainian Church does not depend on the Russian Church but within the framework of its broad autonomy, it enjoys administrative independence.
2. It is noteworthy that the Expert Group included as members a "senior researcher and candidate in historical sciences" (?), doctors of history and philosophy, university professors, as well as a civil servant. What is striking is that in such a critical state committee, dealing with sensitive issues of Canon Law and broader Orthodox ecclesiology, there was no specialist in Canon Law or even a theologian, knowledgeable in Orthodox ecclesiology and canonical order. The lack of theological education and understanding of fundamental provisions of Canon Law within the Expert Group is evident in its findings. And it is only paragraph 7.4.2, in which the Experts suggest to the canonical Church how it should act within the pan-Orthodox communion of the local Orthodox Churches, that demonstrates their complete lack of even basic theological training.
3. It is also surprising that no legal expert was included in the state commission in question, despite the fact that, as is evident from the text itself, the Commission took into account "the provisions of Ukrainian legislation, which define the signs of entry of religious organisations conducting their activities in Ukraine into the structure of foreign religious centres when determining the presence/absence of a connection of the UOC with the Moscow Patriarchate (i.e., the Ukrainian Law on ‘Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations’)."
4. The Expert Group states that in its examination it used "general principles of objectivity, knowledge, modelling, worldview pluralism, integrity, systematicity and contextual approaches, comparative analysis, as well as, in particular, religious principles of freedom of conscience and tolerance". It is worth noting that, as the Group itself acknowledges, it did not take into account in its conclusions the fundamental canonical and theological–ecclesiological principles that should govern the relationships between the Orthodox Churches. Furthermore, the Group did not consider in its findings the provisions on religious freedom under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the relevant abundant case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The lack of these fundamental theological and legal principles and provisions is evident in its conclusions.
5. Moreover, the Expert Group oversteps its remit by delving into issues that touch on Orthodox ecclesiology, canonical order, and pan-Orthodox church communion. However, a state body is not entitled to conduct a review of matters relating to interna corporis, the internal life of religious communities. It may only examine whether the actions of an ecclesiastical structure and its representatives are in accordance with the law. Nothing beyond that. The canonical and ecclesiological status of a local Church and its relations with other Orthodox Churches are strictly internal Church matters, theological and ecclesiological, that do not fall under the control of state authorities.
Therefore, within the framework of the self-governance of religious communities, the ecclesiological status (autonomy or autocephaly) of the UOC, which is recognised as a canonical Orthodox Church by ALL local Orthodox Churches, cannot be the subject of examination, evaluation, or criticism by a state authority. Far from it, the state authority has no right to recommend or demand that a canonically recognised Church change its ecclesiological status and alter its relations with other local Churches according to the wishes of the political authorities. The Orthodox Church is not a state institution to be subjected to recommendations or orders from the Administration/Government on how to regulate its church life and its relationships with other Orthodox Churches.
Following this, it is inconceivable that the Experts should demand from the canonical Church of Ukraine – as if the Church of Ukraine were a state body – to submit "proposals on models of coexistence with the OCU (under Epifaniy), etc." (par. 7.4.2.), especially at a time when the very validity of the episcopacy of Epifaniy and his associates is legitimately questioned, both by the canonical Church of Ukraine and by most of the Autocephalous Churches, as well as by influential Archbishops and Synods even of those Churches that recognised him (indicatively: the Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus, Metropolitan Hierotheos of Nafpaktos, etc.)!
6. Moreover, according to the fundamental principles of Orthodox Canon Law, it is not possible for a Church to unilaterally and autonomously change its relationship with other local Churches. The Expert Group, ignoring ecclesiology and the canonical order of the Orthodox Church — as we have already noted, there is no theologian among the Group members — reproaches the Autonomous Church of Ukraine for not being autocephalous and demands that it declare itself autocephalous!
The Experts wish to ignore that, according to the canonical order of the Orthodox Church, certain steps must be followed for the proclamation of autocephaly. As outlined in the decision of the Pan-Orthodox Preparatory Committee (Chambésy, 9-17 December 2009), which was unanimously adopted by all the Orthodox Churches, "the Ecumenical Patriarch, expressing the consent of the Mother Church and the pan-Orthodox agreement, officially declares the autocephaly of the requesting Church by issuing the Tomos of Autocephaly." It is clear that, as the pan-Orthodox community has been formed today, there is no possibility for a request for autocephaly to succeed for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Metropolitan Onufriy, because: a) not all the faithful of the canonical Church of Ukraine want the autocephaly of their Church, and, certainly, no one has the right to force them to… want it; b) Russia as the Mother Church has not declared its willingness to grant such autocephaly to the UOC; c) the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the other three Churches that recognised Epifaniy (Alexandria, Cyprus, Greece) will certainly not want there to be another autocephaly in Ukraine.
Therefore, the demand of the Expert Group for granting autocephaly to Metropolitan Onufriy entirely lacks basic seriousness. Unless, of course, President Zelensky wants Metropolitan Onufriy and his Synod to unilaterally declare themselves autocephalous. However, in that case, they would cease to be the canonical Church recognised by ALL Orthodox Churches and would fall into schism, which no other Orthodox Church would recognise. Perhaps, this is the goal: for a canonical Church to self-negate and turn into a schismatic one!
7. It is therefore evident that, as the pan-Orthodox community is structured today, it is not possible for autocephaly to be granted, nor for Metropolitan Onuphry to proclaim autocephaly unilaterally. So why do the Experts mention autocephaly? Clearly, Zelensky intends to have the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, with its millions of believers, thousands of parishes, priests and monks, hundreds of monasteries, and over 100 bishops, outlawed and driven into illegality, unable to perform its saving liturgical, preaching, charitable, missionary, and generally pastoral work.
8. Very often in its conclusions, the Expert Group criticises the Ukrainian Church for decisions made by the Holy Synod of the Russian Church, in which no Ukrainian bishop has participated since 22 May 2022, not even the Metropolitan of Kyiv, and from which it has become administratively independent. In other words, the Experts make the attribution of rights and this legal status and existence of the Church of Ukraine dependent on the behaviour of another Church from which it is administratively independent and whose decisions it cannot influence. We particularly refer to the following:
i. In paragraph 3, the expertise report refers to the documents examined by the Expert Group. Of the seven documents, three are exclusively and solely from the Moscow Patriarchate: [“Letter of Alexis II” (27.10.90), “Decisions of the Holy Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church” (25-27.10.90), “The Current Version of the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church” (2017)].
ii. In paragraph 6.1, the Experts acknowledge that “the clause regarding the ‘approval by the Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus’ of the Statute for the administration of the UOC was indeed ‘removed’ from the new edition of the Statute of the UOC,” but the Ukrainian Church is criticised because “the rules… remain in force in the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church”! Furthermore, the Experts conclude: “This may also mean that for the ROC, the UOC is considered de facto to have the previous version of the Statute, where all references to the connection with the ROC have not been removed from the text”!
iii. In paragraph 6.2, the Experts refer exclusively to two documents of the Russian Church, which are related: “The wording of the Letter (i.e. of Patriarch Alexis II of Moscow) requires the examination of the decision of the Bishops’ Council of the ROC, which took place on 25-27 October 1990. Moreover, according to the Letter, the UOC must be governed by ‘the definitions of this Council of Bishops’.”
However, the Experts fail to note that, following the decision of 27.05.22 by the Holy Synod of the UOC, the Church is no longer governed by the “definitions of the Council of Bishops” of Russia.
iv. In paragraph 6.3, the Experts refer to the provision in the Statute of the Russian Church, which envisages “the permanent presence of the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the administrative body of the Moscow Patriarchate”. However, they fail to disclose that, following the decision of 27.05.22, the Primate of the Ukrainian Church no longer participates in the Holy Synod of Russia.
v. Paragraph 6.4 analyses in detail the current Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church (2017) and concludes that “the dependency of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church on the Russian Orthodox Church is also evident from the following clauses in the Statute of the ROC.” We again emphasise that the Synod of the ROC cannot influence the decisions of the Synod of the UOC!
vi. In paragraph 7.3, the Experts assert that “The status of the UOC as a subordinate part of the ROC is also defined in the current edition of the Statute of the ROC” and in 7.3.1, “The Statute of the ROC provides for the status of ‘independent and self-governing’ for the UOC (Chapter 10, Clause 2). Such a status is not interpreted by the Russian Orthodox Church as an indication of a separate or entirely independent ecclesiastical structure.”
The Church and War
9. The Zelensky Government and the Experts relate their demand for a break from the Russian Church and the self-proclamation of autocephaly by the Ukrainian Church to the war declared by Russia against Ukraine (February 2022), arguing that it is unthinkable that the Church of Ukraine should have its centre in the enemy state. Otherwise, if it does not comply with the government's demand, the Church will be outlawed (see Law 8371/20.8.2024).
The relationships between the Orthodox Churches and their canonical status have a deep historical background and a centuries-old tradition, which is not only unmatched in any other field of human activity (politics, economics, geopolitics, etc.), but also existed long before the formation of modern states. That is to say, it is not a situational formation of relations dependent on individuals or current circumstances. Anyone who does not take this into account, whether they are a political or ecclesiastical leader, either neglects very basic elements or consciously shows disrespect towards our ecclesiastical tradition or seeks to undermine pan-Orthodox cooperation and communion.
The war in Ukraine is certainly a sad and destructive event for which the perpetrators of its declaration, continuation, and escalation are accountable before history. However, it can in no way serve as a governmental excuse for the attempt to dismantle a historical Church, the origins of which date back to the first millennium. The war will certainly end soon, and we all sincerely wish this. It is therefore inconceivable that a three-year event, no matter how unacceptable, harsh, and destructive it may be, should erase and redefine the spiritual, canonical, and historical relations between the Orthodox Churches, which have been forged and shaped based on Orthodox ecclesiology and canonical tradition over the centuries, even in conditions that were just as harsh, if not harsher.
I already hear the objection: “Patriarch Kirill of Moscow blessed the war. How can we be in ecclesiastical communion with him and commemorate him?”
Answer:
i) I have already stated that the canonical status of the Orthodox Churches does not depend on the temporal actions of certain individuals or ecclesiastical leaders.
ii) According to our canonical and ecclesiastical tradition, the cessation of communion (excommunication) with a Primate is prescribed exclusively and only when he “proclaims a condemned heresy”, not for other inappropriate behaviours (Canons 13-15 of the First-Second Synod). However, even in such a case, ecclesiastical communion is not severed with the entire Church of the heretical patriarch but only with him.
Those who particularly highlight the argument that Patriarch Kirill “blessed the weapons against Ukraine” forget (?) that Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople, in a similar case, “blessed” the Turkish troops in the "Olive Branch Operation" (2018) against Syria.
Let us recall the relevant letter of the Ecumenical Patriarch to the President of Turkey, R. Erdoğan, as published by NEA (26.01.2018): “As a tradition of our Church, we always pray for our state, for the health of our leaders, and for the happiness and well-being of our people. We have not forgotten the hundreds who have been displaced due to the conflicts in our southern neighbourhood, and especially in Syria,” the Ecumenical Patriarch states, continuing by saying that “it is the desire of our community for our nation to rapidly develop in an environment of trust, with the end of this disease called terror, which has affected all our citizens, but especially the Kurdish citizens living in the southeast of Turkey,” and concludes in his letter to Erdoğan: “The decisive stance of President Erdoğan, who strictly forbids the association of any religion with terrorism, is reflected in global public opinion. We pray that you and the Turkish Armed Forces will succeed, and that the ‘Olive Branch Operation’ will bring peace to the region, as its name promises.”
No one, of course, ever thought to condemn the Ecumenical Patriarch or to support the idea that the Patriarchate of Antioch should sever communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate due to the blessing of the Turkish invasion of Syria...
The use of double standards does not honour those who use them...
The attitude of the Greek Church to the Patriarch of the "aggressor state"
Orthodoxy in Greece also found itself in similar circumstances. Throughout the period of Ottoman rule and during the seven-year struggle of the National Rebirth (1821-1828), the spiritual and administrative centre of our Church was the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople (in the "enemy state"). Moreover, the canonical jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was absolute (full rights to ordain, judge and appoint bishops) in the rebelled Greece. However, neither the enslaved nor the later revolutionary fighters ever said, nor even thought, that they should sever their spiritual and ecclesiastical communion with Constantinople because it belonged to an "enemy state"! Even when Patriarch Gregory V "condemned" and "excommunicated" the Revolution, the Greeks understood his position and felt his true sentiment against the national uprising, which was later confirmed when he became a National Martyr and a Holy Martyr through his martyrdom.
The ecclesiastical mindset of the uneducated Orthodox Greeks understood that it was impossible for temporary historical circumstances to put into question or destroy the ecclesiastical and spiritual experience of centuries. Only later, when the newly established Greek State under the reign of King Otto of German descent came under the control of Western Papist-Protestant regents, did the argument arise that is now repeated by the Zelensky government and the ecclesiastical figures supporting it. At that time, some Greeks "remembered" that Constantinople belonged to an "enemy state" and that we must, at all costs, break away from it through autocephaly! The consequences are well known... History is now tragically repeating itself in Ukraine, but in reverse: those who condemned the poisonous arguments for the autocephaly of Greece are now using them word-for-word in Ukraine...
However, we must not forget that the hostile stance of the Ukrainian state towards the canonical Ukrainian Church did not begin because of the war (February 2022) but a decade earlier, following Maidan (2014). It intensified after the granting of autocephaly (January 2019) and has culminated under the Zelensky government with violence, the occupation and seizure of shrines, criminal prosecutions, and, most recently, with Law 8371/20.8.2024, which seeks to outlaw the canonical Church and cease its operation. However, if we wish to be honest and look for the historical attempt at a spiritual, canonical, and ecclesiastical separation of the Metropolis of Kyiv (the Ukrainian Church) and the Metropolis of Moscow (the Russian Church), we will easily discover that this has been a long-standing and deep desire of Western political and religious powers for over eight centuries. The obstacle to these plans has been the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which, through the efforts of holy Orthodox Patriarchs, fought for the ecclesiastical and spiritual unity of Kyiv and Moscow. History has shown that, when in the 14th century the heretical and Latin-influenced Patriarch John (Kalekas) ascended the Throne of Constantinople, the ecclesiastical unity of Kyiv and Moscow was broken. The restoration of ecclesiastical unity was achieved under the Orthodox hesychast Patriarch Isidore I, and this unity was fought for by his successors, Saint Patriarchs Callistus I and Philotheos (Kokkinos). For a detailed account of the unity and the attempts to break it, see Protopresbyter Th. Zisis, “The Ukrainian Autocephaly, an Uncanonical and Divisive Intrusion of Constantinople”, published by Palimpsest, Thessaloniki 2018, pp. 38-78.
However, even the state of war that Ukraine is experiencing does not allow its Government to take such an extreme measure and outlaw a historic Church whose members are the majority of the Ukrainian people, simply because it is not autocephalous but is canonically and spiritually subordinate to the Church of Russia. Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is clear and stipulates: "In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law."
10. As we have already mentioned, the Expert Group has intervened in matters related to Orthodox ecclesiology, canonical order, and inter-Orthodox communion, that is, interna corporis, the innermost core of ecclesiastical life, of a historic Church that enjoys recognition and respect from all the Orthodox Churches. Essentially, it seeks to undermine the autonomy of a historic religious community.
This stance of the state authorities towards a historic Church represents a blatant violation of religious freedom, both for the Ukrainian Church as a legal entity and for the millions of Ukrainian citizens who are Church members.
However, religious freedom is protected by:
- the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (Article 18);
- the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Article 5);
- the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 18);
- the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Preamble and Article 8);
- and, most notably, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) [Articles 9, 10 (freedom of expression and religion), 11 (freedom of assembly and association), as well as Article 6 (access to justice)], and by the First Protocol to the ECHR (Articles 1 and 2), whose provisions the Ukrainian state is obliged to respect.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has issued interesting case law based on the ECHR in similar cases, condemning the practices of the Ukrainian Government under Zelensky against the canonical Ukrainian Church. Specifically, according to the ECHR:
a) The autonomy and self-governance of religious communities, which are jointly safeguarded in Articles 9 and 11 of the ECHR, in order to ensure the collective expression of religious beliefs against arbitrary state interference, constitute a fundamental component of a pluralistic democratic society, where various religions or denominations of the same religion coexist. Consequently, according to the Court, state authorities must observe the duty of neutrality and impartiality.
b) In cases where state authorities attempts to intervene in matters of internal conflict between members of a religious community, Article 9, read in light of Article 11, “encompasses the expectation that the community will be allowed to function peacefully, free from arbitrary State intervention" and, therefore, "State measures favouring a particular leader or specific organs of a divided religious community or seeking to compel the community or part of it to place itself, against its will, under a single leadership, would also constitute an infringement of the freedom of religion".
c) In cases of tensions and disagreements between religious communities, the state's obligation is to promote pluralism: "Although the Court recognises that tension may arise in cases where a religious or other community is divided, it believes that this division is one of the inevitable consequences of pluralism. The role of the authorities in such cases is not to remove the cause of the tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure tolerance among the competing groups".
"Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova"
An exceptionally interesting ruling by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is the case of "Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova" (13.12.2001):
The Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia is an Orthodox Church active in Moldova, but ecclesiastically under the jurisdiction of the Romanian Patriarchate. This Church was not recognised by Moldova, with arguments similar to those of the Ukrainian Government (such as threats to national security, social unrest, the existence of another Church, etc.). The refusal to recognise the Church resulted in the Metropolis of Bessarabia being outlawed, deprived of its legal personality, unable to appear before administrative or judicial authorities, not being provided with the expected protection by the state authorities, deprived of the property necessary for its activity, while its members were subjected to acts of violence and intimidation, without any protection from the authorities, etc.
The Metropolis of Bessarabia appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg with its 45701/1999 application against the State of Moldova. Since many of the facts in the "Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova" case are similar to those occurring against the Ukrainian Church, we present a few excerpts from the reasoning of the ECHR's Resolution:
i) "In the present case the Court observes that, not being recognised, the applicant Church cannot operate. In particular, its priests may not conduct divine service, its members may not meet to practise their religion and, not having legal personality, it is not entitled to judicial protection of its assets. The Court therefore considers that the government’s refusal to recognise the applicant Church, upheld by the Supreme Court of Justice’s decision of 9 December 1997, constituted interference with the right of the applicant Church and the other applicants to freedom of religion, as guaranteed by Article 9 § 1 of the Convention" (para. 105 of the Resolution).
ii) "The Court further observes that in principle the right to freedom of religion for the purposes of the Convention excludes assessment by the State of the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed. State measures favouring a particular leader or specific organs of a divided religious community or seeking to compel the community or part of it to place itself, against its will, under a single leadership, would also constitute an infringement of the freedom of religion. In democratic societies the State does not need to take measures to ensure that religious communities remain or are brought under a unified leadership" (para. 117 of the Resolution).
iii) "Since religious communities traditionally exist in the form of organised structures, Article 9 must be interpreted in the light of Article 11 of the Convention, which safeguards associative life against unjustified State interference. Seen in that perspective, the right of believers to freedom of religion, which includes the right to manifest one’s religion in community with others, encompasses the expectation that believers will be allowed to associate freely, without arbitrary State intervention. Indeed, the autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and is thus an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords" (Para. 118 of the Resolution).
iv) "The Court observes that the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality, as defined in its case-law, is incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs, and requires the State to ensure that conflicting groups tolerate each other, even where they originated in the same group. In the present case, the Court considers that by taking the view that the applicant Church was not a new denomination and by making its recognition depend on the will of an ecclesiastical authority that had been recognised – the Metropolitan Church of Moldova – the State failed to discharge its duty of neutrality and impartiality. Consequently, the Government’s argument that refusing recognition was necessary in order to uphold Moldovan law and the Moldovan Constitution must be rejected" (Para. 123 of the Resolution).
v) "The Court notes that the refusal to recognise the applicant Church played a role in the incidents" (Para. 127 of the Ruling).
vi) "In conclusion, the Court considers that the refusal to recognise the applicant Church has such consequences for the applicants’ freedom of religion that it cannot be regarded as proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued or, accordingly, as necessary in a democratic society, and that there has been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention" (Para. 130 of the Resolution).
Ultimately, the Strasbourg Court condemned Moldova and obliged it to compensate and recognize the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia – ecclesiastically under the Patriarchate of Romania – granting it all the rights provided for by international conventions on the protection of human rights.
11. Of particular interest, in connection with the present criticism, is the latest 41st Report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (31 December 2024) on religious freedom in Ukraine (paragraphs 84-89). The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights accuses the Ukrainian government of introducing “a severe restriction that affects the ability of individuals to practice their religion or belief together with others and threatens the viability of the community as a whole". Due to its significance, the relevant paragraphs from the latest report are published as an appendix to this document. It is also noted that similar concerns have been expressed by the Office of the High Commissioner in the past, while the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, on 19 December 2023, in his speech before the UN Human Rights Committee, stated: "I note also my concerns regarding freedom of religion and belief in Ukraine, given continuing action by the authorities against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. A draft law would set out a procedure for dissolving any religious organization with ties to the Russian Federation. These proposed restrictions to the right to freedom of religion do not appear to comply with international human rights law."
The interest of the UN High Commissioner in the protection of the canonical Church of Ukraine should serve as a moral check on the ecclesiastical leaderships of certain Orthodox Churches who, contrary to any notion of fraternal and Christian solidarity, remain guilty of silence in the face of the ongoing crime of the persecution of the canonical Church of Ukraine by the Zelensky government, with the consent and complicity of the autocephalous religious structure of Epifaniy and his associates.
How is it possible that secular authorities raise their voices in protest, while the members of the Body of Christ remain silent?!
Conclusions
The findings of the Expert Group and the Resolution No. H-8/11/27.1.2023 of the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience of Ukraine, titled "Conclusion of the Religious Expert Examination of the Statute on Governance of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church for the presence of ecclesiastical and canonical ties with the Moscow Patriarchate", are highly biased against the historical Ukrainian Church and cannot be accepted within the framework of a law-abiding state, which must respect the history, faith, and religious rights of its citizens.
The Ukrainian Church, with thousands of the clergy (bishops, priests, monks) and millions of believers, all Ukrainian citizens, with a history of over 1,000 years, recognised by all Orthodox Churches and Patriarchates, is now facing the actions of the Ukrainian government.
Orthodox Churches, leaders and believers must support, by all means and at any cost, the suffering and persecuted Orthodox Church, unique in Europe, the historical Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Metropolitan Onufriy.
